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Non-technical summary
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical model allowing for the seigniorage financing of productive public spending. In line with numerous recent empirical stylized facts (Kim & Willett, 2000 , Black et al., 2001 , Bolton & Alexander, 2001 ), we emphasize the presence of nonlinearities between seigniorage and economic growth. Empirical evidence based on panel regression techniques on a sample of 22 OECD countries using annual data over the period support the predictions of our theoretical model. We also test for a structural equation to investigate the existence of a joint inverted-U relation between both seigniorage and taxes, and growth, which is empirically confirmed by data.
Introduction
Early theoretical growth models conclude that inflation is harmful or at best neutral to economic growth, as Palivos & Yip (1995) . Empirical work in Alexander (1997) emphasizes similar conclusions, but Paul et al. (1997) and Arai et al. (2004) question the robustness of this result. Further contributions isolate a negative correlation between inflation and economic growth, but only for high inflation (Black et al., 2001 , or Bolton & Alexander, 2001 , suggesting that the relation between inflation and growth is probably nonlinear (Kim & Willett, 2000) .
The aim of this paper is to emphasize the presence of nonlinearities between monetary policy and economic growth. For this matter, we develop in the next section a theoretical model allowing for nonlinear effects of seigniorage on growth.
The empirical validity of these nonlinear effects is demonstrated in section 3 for a sample of OECD countries using panel regression techniques over the period. Concluding remarks are reported in section 4.
The model
We consider a closed economy with a representative agent, a government and monetary authorities. The agent maximizes intertemporal utility, with a log-utility based on consumption ( 0 t c > ) and 0 > β the subjective discount rate 1 :
1 Results are not modified for a more general isoelastic function ( ) ( 
Household budget constraint is, in real variables (
Households use their income ( ) 
Relation (5) However, Palivos & Yip (1995) consider exogenous unproductive public spending, while they are endogenous in our framework.
Maximizing (1) subject to (2)- (3)- (4) To enlighten Proposition 1a,b, remark that any increase in seigniorage is devoted to productive public expenditures that are growth-enhancing (numerator of (6)), but such an increase simultaneously raises the financing cost of private investment, which is harmful to growth (denominator of (6)). The trade-off between these two effects illustrates that productive public spending crowd-out private investment, results in the ceiling * θ . As tax rate increases, the elasticity of public spending to seigniorage decreases, which explains why Thirlwall & Barton (1971) identify the positive effects of inflation rates inferior-to-8%, on growth and negative effects for inflation higher-than-10%. Gylfasson (1991) associates high-growth countries with lower-to-5% inflation rates, and low-growth economies to inflation higher than-20%, while Sarrel (1996) and Bolton & Alexander (2001) find a breakpoint in inflation to growth relation.
Empirical link between monetary policy and economic growth
The effects of seigniorage on economic growth
To investigate the empirical validity of our theoretical results, we perform panel regressions on a sample of 22 OECD countries 4 using annual data covering the period 1978-2005. Selected variables are real GDP growth (γ ) and the tax rate (τ , computed as the fiscal and non-fiscal total revenues of public administration to GDP ratio) from OECD Economic Perspectives, with money growth θ from the IMF database IFS. Table 1 exhibits results related to the estimation of a model including fixed effects in accordance with data properties. Table 1 ). Nevertheless, they imply opposite correlations between the optimal seigniorage value 
Nonlinear joint effects between seigniorage, taxes and economic growth
In accordance with Proposition 1, both taxes and seigniorage exhibit nonlinear effects on economic growth. Next, we investigate the presence of a joint nonlinear relation between seigniorage, taxes and growth, in which both optimal money * θ and taxes * τ would depend on τ and θ respectively. Consequently, our regressions must enclose square-money growth and square taxes (for possible inverted-U curves), but also a multiple of θ τ * . while less adapted to approximate joint inverted-U curves.
To deal with this issue, we directly consider equation (6). For this purpose, assuming δ and β sufficiently small, one can log-linearize (6) and get:
, with
We then estimate the following equation on the same panel data set of OECD countries: All coefficients are now significant with a sign in accordance with theoretical expectations (positive for τ − 1 and θ τ + and negative for θ + 1 ). These econometric results provide evidence in favor of the theoretical model developed in section 2, and emphasize the empirical relevance of a joint inverted-U relation between taxes, seigniorage and growth.
Concluding remarks
We developed in this paper a theoretical model allowing for the seigniorage financing of productive public spending. In line with numerous recent empirical stylized facts (Kim & Willett, 2000 , Black et al., 2001 , Bolton & Alexander, 2001 ),
we emphasized the presence of nonlinearities between seigniorage and economic growth. Empirical evidence based on panel regression techniques on a sample of 22 OECD countries using annual data over the 1978-2005 period support the predictions of our theoretical model. We also tested for a structural equation to investigate the existence of a joint inverted-U relation between both seigniorage and taxes, and growth, which was empirically confirmed by data.
